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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the coordination of
autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both
encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the
encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-
run utility functions. The topology of the point-to-point network
under investigation, suggests that the decoder implements a
strategy, knowing in advance the strategy of the encoder. We
characterize the encoding and decoding functions that form an
equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The equilibrium
solution is related to an auxiliary game in which both players
choose some conditional distributions in order to maximize
their expected utilities. This problem is closely related to the
literature on “Information Design” in Game Theory. We also
characterize the set of posterior distributions that are compatible
with a rate-limited channel between the encoder and the decoder.
Finally, we provide an example of non-aligned utility functions
corresponding to parallel fading multiple access channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous
devices with non-aligned utility functions. We consider a
point-to-point network, depicted in Fig. 1, with an i.i.d. infor-
mation source Pu(u), an encoder P1, a memoryless channel
T (y|x) and a decoder P2. The encoder and the decoder
are considered as players, endowed with utility functions
φ1(u, v) ∈ R and φ2(u, v) ∈ R. Both utilities depend on the
source symbol u ∈ U and on the action v ∈ V of player P2, the
decoder. In the n-stage game, the players choose the optimal
encoding and the decoding functions. The accumulated utilities
are characterized by using the empirical coordination of the
random variables (U, V ).
The problem of empirical coordination was investigated in
both literatures of Game Theory [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and Infor-
mation Theory [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. The objective
is to characterize the set of target empirical distributions that
are achievable by using a coding scheme. Optimal solutions
have been characterized for lossless decoding [13], for state-
dependent source and channel [14], for channel feedback
[15], for the two-agent case [16]. Polar coding scheme for
empirical coordination has been further investigated in [17],
[18], [19], [20]. In [21], the authors measure the secrecy in
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communication systems, using a rate-distortion approach that
is closely related to empirical coordination. In [22], the authors
investigate the connexion between the empirical coordination
and the state-leakage induced by a coding scheme. Empiri-
cal coordination captures the knowledge of the transmitters,
regarding the random variables they don’t observe.
The network topology of Fig. 1 suggests that the decoder
P2 implements a strategy, knowing in advance the strategy
of the encoder P1. In contrast to the definition of the “Nash
Equilibrium” [23], this strategic interaction is not simultaneous
and corresponds to the “Stackelberg Equilibrium” [24]. The
transmission of strategic information has attracted a lot of
attention in the literature of Game Theory [25], [26]. In [27],
the authors investigate the problem of “Bayesian Persuasion”
in which a sender wants to persuade a receiver to change her
action. The state of the nature is a random variable observed
by the sender P1 but not by the receiver P2. The sender
applies a strategic quantification, designed in order to modify
the posterior distributions of the receiver, regarding the state of
the nature. The sender chooses an optimal signaling structure,
knowing that the receiver implements a best-reply with respect
to her posterior belief. This problem is called “Information
Un Xn Y n V nPu TP1 P2
φ1(u, v) φ2(u, v)
Fig. 1. Strategic Empirical Coordination: The information source is i.i.d.
Pu and the channel T is memoryless. The encoder P1 and the decoder P2
are players, endowed with non-aligned utility functions φ1(u, v) ∈ R and
φ2(u, v) ∈ R, depending on the source U and decoder’s action V .
Design” and relies on the ‘Splitting Lemma” in the literature
on Repeated Games with Incomplete Information [28], [29],
[30]. Dynamic versions of this problem were considered in
[31], [32], [33], where the informed player announces her
strategy in each stage. In [34], the receiver fixes her strategy
before the encoder, that react knowing in advance the strategy
of the decoder. Strategic communication was considered more
recently in the literature of Information Theory, for Gaussian
source and channel with quadratic cost functions in [35], [36]
and [37].
2In this paper, we characterize the encoding and decoding
functions that form an equilibrium in the long-run game. We
introduce an auxiliary game in which both players choose the
conditional distributions that maximize their expected utilities.
The main result is stated in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we characterize
the set of posterior distributions that are compatible with a
rate-limited channel. In Sec. IV, we provide an example of
non-aligned utility functions corresponding to parallel fading
multiple access channels. Conclusion is stated in Sec. V and
the proofs of the main result are stated in App. A and B.
II. STRATEGIC EMPIRICAL COORDINATION
A. Problem Statement
We consider the problem of strategic empirical coordination
depicted in Fig. 1. Notations Un, Xn, Y n, V n stand for
sequences of random variables of information source un =
(u1, . . . , un) ∈ Un, inputs of the channel xn ∈ Xn, outputs
of the channel yn ∈ Yn and decoder’s output vn ∈ Vn,
respectively. The sets U , X , Y , V have finite cardinality.
The set of probability distributions over X is denoted by
∆(X ). The notation ||Q − P||1 =
∑
x∈X |Q(x) − P(x)|
stands for the L1 distance between the probability distributions
Q and P . With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by
Q(x)×Q(v|x), the product of distributions over ∆(X × V).
Notation Y −
−X −
− U denotes the Markov chain property
corresponding to P(y|x, u) = P(y|x) for all (u, x, y). Player
P1 observes a sequence of source symbols u
n ∈ Un and
chooses at random a sequence of channel inputs xn ∈ Xn.
Player P2 observes a sequence of channel outputs y
n ∈ Yn
and chooses at random a sequence of actions vn ∈ Vn.
Definition II.1 (Strategies of both players)
• Player P1 chooses a strategy σ and player P2 chooses a
strategy τ , defined as follows:
σ : Un −→ ∆(Xn), (1)
τ : Yn −→ ∆(Vn). (2)
Both strategies (σ, τ) are stochastic.
• A pair of strategies (σ, τ) induces a joint probability
distribution Pσ,τ ∈ ∆(Un × Xn × Yn × Vn) over the n-
sequences of symbols, defined by:
n∏
i=1
P
(
Ui
)
× Pσ
(
X
n
∣∣∣Un)×
n∏
i=1
T
(
Yi
∣∣∣Xi
)
× Pτ
(
V
n
∣∣∣Y n). (3)
Definition II.2 (Expected n-stage utilities)
The utilities of the n-stage game Φn1 and Φ
n
2 are evaluated with
respect to the marginal distribution Pσ,τ over the sequences
(Un, V n) and the utility functions φ1(u, v) ∈ R, φ2(u, v) ∈ R.
Φn1 (σ, τ) = Eσ,τ
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ1(Ui, Vi)
]
=
∑
un,vn
Pσ,τ
(
un, vn
)
·
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ1(ui, vi)
]
,(4)
Φn2 (σ, τ) =
∑
un,vn
Pσ,τ
(
un, vn
)
·
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
]
.(5)
Definition II.3 (Equilibrium utilities)
We assume that player P2 knows in advance the strategy σ of
player P1 and chooses the mapping σ 7→ τ(σ).
(
Φ⋆1,Φ
⋆
2
) ∈
R2 is a pair of equilibrium utilities if there exists strategies(
σ⋆, τ⋆(σ)
)
for both players P1 and P2 that satisfy:
1)
(
Φn1
(
σ⋆, τ⋆(σ)
)
,Φn2
(
σ⋆, τ⋆(σ)
))
converge to
(
Φ⋆1,Φ
⋆
2
)
,
as n −→ +∞,
2) for all ε > 0, there exists a n¯ ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n¯,
the two following equilibrium conditions are satisfied:
∀σ, Φn2
(
σ, τ⋆(σ)
) ≥ max
τ˜
Φn2
(
σ, τ˜
)− ε, (6)
Φn1
(
σ⋆, τ⋆(σ⋆)
) ≥ max
σ˜
Φn1
(
σ˜, τ⋆(σ˜)
)− ε. (7)
Remark II.4 In Definition II.3, player P2 has access to strat-
egy σ of player P1, before choosing her strategy σ 7→ τ(σ).
This “Stackelberg Equilibrium” [24] hypothesis comes from
the topology of the point-to-point network, Fig. 1.
B. Target Probability Distribution
In this section, we characterize the pair of equilibrium
utilities
(
Φ⋆1,Φ
⋆
2
)
, by using a target probability distribution:
Pu(u)×Q(v|u) ∈ ∆(U × V). (8)
Intuitively, the strategies σ and τ of Definition II.1 form a
coding scheme. An auxiliary random variable W is used to
characterize the message wn ∈ Wn sent by the encoder P1
and the message wˆn ∈ Wn decoded by the decoder P2. The
decoding is correct if wn = wˆn. The objective is to control
the empirical distribution Qn(u,w, v) ∈ ∆(U×W×V) of the
sequences of actions and messages (Un,Wn, V n), in order to
achieve the following joint distribution:
Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) ∈ ∆(U ×W × V), (9)
with marginals on (U, V ) given by (8). The auxiliary random
variable W captures the common information shared by both
players P1 and P2. The distribution of (9) satisfies the Markov
chain: U −
−W −
− V . We introduce the sets of target joint
probability distributions Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) ∈ ∆(U ×
W ×V) that are achievable Q0 and that satisfy the best-reply
condition Q2 for player P2.
Definition II.5 (Achievable target distributions)
We define the set Q0 of joint probability distributions Pu(u)×
Q(w|u)×Q(v|w), that satisfy:
Q0 =
{
Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w), s.t.
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− I(W ;U) ≥ 0
}
. (10)
The set Q0 is convex since the mutual information I(W ;U)
is convex in Q(w|u), for fixed Pu(u).
The information constraint (10) of Q0 does not depend
on the conditional distribution Q(v|w), but only on the
product of Pu(u) × Q(w|u) and on the channel capacity
maxP(x) I(X ;Y ). It ensures that the decoder can correctly
recover the sequence Wˆn = Wn, with high probability.
3Definition II.6 (Strategic compatibility for player P2)
We define the set Q2 of joint probability distributions Pu(u)×
Q(w|u)×Q(v|w), that are strategically compatible for P2.
Q2 =
{
Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) s.t.,
EQ
[
φ2(U, V )
]
≥ EQ˜
[
φ2(U, V )
]
,
∀ Q˜(u,w, v) = Pu(u)×Q(w|u)× Q˜(v|w)
}
.(11)
We denote by BR2
(Q(w|u)), the set of distributions Q(v|w)
that are best-replies of player P2, for distribution Q(w|u). The
set Q2 is convex since the expectation is linear.
For all joint probability distributions Pu(u) × Q(w|u), the
second player P2 can generate a symbol v ∈ V , by using
another conditional probability distribution Q˜(v|w) than the
prescribed one Q(v|w). Definition II.6 ensures that the target
distribution is optimal for player P2.
Definition II.7 (Set of target distributions)
We define the set Q of joint distributions Pu(u)×Q(v|u) that
satisfy the following conditions:
Q =
{
Q(v|u) s.t. ∃W with U −
−W −
− V,∑
w
Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) = Pu(u)×Q(v|u)
and Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) ∈ Q0 ∩Q2
}
. (12)
The set Q is convex since Q0 and Q2 are convex for any W .
The definition of Q involves an auxiliary random variable W
that satisfies the Markov chain U−
−W−
−V and the marginal
conditions Pu(u)×Q(v|u). The random variable W captures
the information of P2 regarding U and the information of
P1 regarding V . The set Q characterizes the conditional
distributionsQ(v|u) that are achievable and that satisfy a best-
reply condition for player P2. The conditional distributions
Q(v|u) outside Q cannot support equilibrium utilities.
Theorem II.8 The equilibrium utility Φ⋆1 of player P1 is:
Φ⋆1 = max
Q(v|u)∈Q
E
[
Φ1(U, V )
]
. (13)
The equilibrium utility Φ⋆2 = E
[
Φ2(U, V )
]
is given by
the expectation with respect to the conditional distribution
Q⋆(v|u) ∈ Q that achieves the maximum in equation (13).
The proof of Theorem II.8 is stated in App. A and B. The n-
stage game of Definition II.3 is reformulated using a one-shot
game in which P1 chooses the optimal achievable distribution
Q(w|u), knowing that P2 implements a best-reply Q(v|w) ∈
BR2
(Q(w|u)).
III. INFORMATION DESIGN: STRATEGIC COMPRESSION
A. Control of the Posterior Distributions
We consider the binary information source U ∈ {u1, u2}
with parameter p ∈ [0, 1], Pu(u1) = p and a binary auxiliary
random variable W ∈ {w1, w2}. The set of conditional
distributions Q(w|u) is represented by Fig. 2 where Q(w|u)
involves two parameters α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. The
u2
u1
(1− p)
p
b
b
b
b
b
w2
w1
1− α
1− β
α
β
Fig. 2. Signaling Q(w|u) depending on α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1].
posterior distributions of u1 given w1 or w2 are denoted by
p1 and p2 and write:
Q(u1|w1) = p · (1− α)
p · (1− α) + (1− p) · β = p1, (14)
Q(u1|w2) = p · α
p · α+ (1− p) · (1− β) = p2. (15)
By inverting the system of equations (14) - (15), we obtain the
parameters (α, β) corresponding to the pair of target posterior
distributions (p1, p2).
α =
p2 · (p1 − p)
p · (p1 − p2) , (16)
β =
(1− p1) · (p− p2)
(1− p) · (p1 − p2) . (17)
Lemma 1 The parameters (α, β, p1, p2) correspond to
Bernouilli distributions if and only if:
1) p /∈ {0, 1} and
2) p1 < p < p2 or p2 < p < p1.
For each pair of posterior distributions (p1, p2) ∈
[0, p[×]p, 1], there exists a pair of (α, β) such that the prior
distribution p can be splitted according to p1 ∈ [0, p[ and
p2 ∈]p, 1].
B. One-Shot Transmission with a Noisy Channel
We consider a binary symmetric channel T (y|x) with
noise parameter ε ∈ [0, 0.5], as represented by Fig. 3. The
concatenation of the signaling structureQ(w|u) with the noisy
channel T (y|x) can be directly expressed with parameters
α ⋆ ε ∈ [0, 1] and β ⋆ ε ∈ [0, 1], instead of α, β and ε.
α ⋆ ε = (1− α) · ε+ α · (1− ε). (18)
Proposition III.1 A pair of posterior distributions (p1, p2) is
achievable with the noisy channel T (y|x) if and only if there
exists (α, β) such that:
α ⋆ ε =
p2 · (p1 − p)
p · (p1 − p2) , (19)
β ⋆ ε =
(1 − p1) · (p− p2)
(1 − p) · (p1 − p2) .
4u2
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p
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β ⋆ ε
Fig. 3. The concatenation of the conditional distributions Q(w|u) and T (y|x)
can be expressed using a binary symmetric channel P(y|u), with noise
parameters α ⋆ ε ∈ [0, 1] and β ⋆ ε ∈ [0, 1].
We can see on Fig. 4 that no α exists such that α ⋆ ε =
α · (1 − 2ε) + ε > 1 − ε or α ⋆ ε < ε. This imposes a
restriction over the set of achievable posteriors (p1, p2), that
is represented by the “region of the circle”, in Fig. 5.
ε
1− ε
α ⋆ ε
α
1
α10.5
Fig. 4. Function α ⋆ ε depending on α ∈ [0, 1].
C. Block Transmission with a Noisy Channel
We consider the scenario represented by Fig. 1 where the
symbols are encoded by blocks. Theorem II.8 states that the
conditional distribution Q(w|u) defined with (α, β) in Fig. 2,
is achievable if and only if:
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− I(U ;W ) ≥ 0, (21)
⇐⇒ 1−H(ε)−H
(
P(W1)
)
+ p ·H(α) + (1 − p) ·H(β) ≥ 0, (22)
with P(W1) = p · (1− α) + (1− p) · β.
Fig. 5 represents three regions of posterior distributions
(p1, p2). The “region of the square” corresponds to posteriors
(p1, p2) that satisfy the information constraint of the set Q0.
It includes the “region of the circle”, in which the posteriors
(p1, p2) are achievable in one-shot and satisfy equations (19)
- (20) of Proposition III.1. The posteriors (p1, p2) that belong
to the “region of the cross”, are not achievable.
Fig. 5. Regions of achievable posteriors (p1, p2), for channel noise ε = 0.25.
IV. NON-ALIGNED UTILITIES: PARALLEL FADING
MULTIPLE ACCESS CHANNELS
A. Power Allocation Game
In this section, we consider an example involving two
transmitters that communicate with two base stations over
parallel fading multiple access channels [38]. The transmis-
sions are simultaneous and cause mutual interferences. Both
transmitters have maximal power equal to 1 and the noise
variance is σ2 = 1. We consider two possible configurations
for the random channel gains G ∈ {gA, gB}, described by
the following table and chosen with probability (p, 1− p) for
p = 0.5. In this section, the channel gains are considered as
an information source U = G.
gA gB
g11 1.1878 0.1811
g12 1.1566 1.4475
g21 0.8407 0.0717
g22 0.6293 0.6858
The notation g12 corresponds to the channel gain between
the first transmitter and the second base station. We assume
that the power allocation of the first transmitter is fixed
(a1, 1 − a1) = (0.16, 0.84). The second transmitter chooses
a power allocation (v, 1 − v) from the discrete set v ∈
V = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, in order to maximize her expected
utility E
[
φ2(G, v)
]
.
E
[
φ2(G, v)
]
= p · φ2(gA, v) + (1− p) · φ2(gB, v),(23)
φ2(g, v) = log2
(
1 +
v · g21
σ2 + a1 · g11
)
+ log2
(
1 +
(1 − v) · g22
σ2 + (1− a1) · g12
)
. (24)
We consider the game between the base station P1 and the
second transmitter P2. The base station is informed of the
realization of the channel gains G ∈ {gA, gB} and wishes
to persuade the second transmitter P2 to choose a favorable
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Fig. 6. Expected utility function E
[
φ2(G, v)
]
of the second transmitter P2,
depending on her power allocation v ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. The best-reply
of P2 is denoted by v
⋆ and depends on her prior probability p ∈ [0, 1].
power allocation v ∈ V . The utility of the base station φ1(G, v)
is equal to the utility of the first transmitter:
φ1(g, v) = log2
(
1 +
a1 · g11
σ2 + v · g12
)
+ log2
(
1 +
(1− a1) · g12
σ2 + (1− v) · g22
)
. (25)
Depending on the realization of the channel gains gA
Fig. 7. Expected utility E
[
φ1(G, v)
]
depending on the pair of posterior
distributions (p1, p2), induced by the signaling Q(w|u) of Fig. 2. The
discontinuities are due to the changes of best-reply v⋆ of P2, see Fig. 6.
or gB , the base station P1 sends a strategic signal W ∈
{w1, w2} to the second transmitter P2 using the signaling
structure Q(w|u), depicted in Fig. 2. Given the strategic
signal W , player P2 chooses the power allocation v ∈
{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} that maximizes her own expected utility
E
[
φ2(G, v)
]
.
Fig. 6 represents the expected utility function E
[
φ2(G, v)
]
depending on the prior probability p ∈ [0, 1], for each
power allocation v ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. The best-reply
allocation of P2 is denoted by v
⋆ and depends on the interval
to which belongs the prior probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Upon
receiving symbol w ∈ W and knowing the joint distribution
Pu(u)×Q(w|u) of Fig. 2, player P2 implements a best-reply
Q(v|w) ∈ BR2
(Q(w|u)). Theorem II.8 guarantees that the
i.i.d. distribution Q(v|w) induces an ε-best-reply in the long-
run game.
Fig. 8. The “green plus” represents the equilibrium utility Φ⋆1 =
maxQ(v|u)∈Q E
[
φ1(G, v)
]
characterized by Theorem II.8, for channel noise
ε = 0.25.
The base station P1 already knows that P2 implements
a best-reply. It chooses accordingly the signaling structure
Q(w|u) that induces the more favorable response of P2. Fig
7 shows the expected utility E
[
φ1(G, v)
]
of P1, depending
on the pair of posterior distributions (p1, p2), induced by the
signaling structure Q(w|u). The discontinuities are due to the
changes of best-reply v⋆ of P2, according to the posterior dis-
tributions (p1, p2), see Fig. 6. The equilibrium utility E[φ1] ≃
0.74 of P1 is represented by the “black circle” and corresponds
to the posterior distributions (p1, p2) = (0, 0.6415), with
(α, β) = (1, 0.4424). This pair of optimal posteriors for P1
is also represented by the “black circles”, on Fig. 6. This
equilibrium utility provides 9.1% of improvement compared
to the revealing strategy (“blue cross” E[φ1] ≃ 0.67), i.e. when
the channel gains are revealed to the second transmitter P2,
with α = β = 0. The authors would like to thank Claudio
Weidmann for fruitful discussions regarding this section.
B. Rate-Limited Channel between Players P1 and P2
We assume that the channel between the base station P1 and
the second transmitter P2 is rate-limited, i.e. there is a noisy
channel T (y|x) between P1 and P2, as depicted in Fig. 1. The
rate-limited constraint reduces the set of posterior distributions
(p1, p2), see Fig. 5. We determine the equilibrium solutions
for a binary symmetric channel with parameter ε = 0.25, for
one-shot and block transmission, as depicted in Fig. 9 and
6Fig. 9. The “red square” represents the equilibrium utility for one-shot
transmission over a noisy channel that satisfies the conditions of Prop. III.1.
Fig. 8. These figures correspond to the utility E
[
φ1(G, v)
]
of Fig. 7, restricted to the “region of the circle” and “region
of the square”, in Fig. 5. The equilibrium utilities correspond
respectively to E
[
φ1(G, v)
] ≃ 0.72 and E[φ1(G, v)] ≃ 0.73.
In both cases, the revealing strategy is not achievable since
it is not compatible with the rate-limitation imposed by the
noisy channel T (y|x).
V. CONCLUSION
We investigate the strategic coordination of an encoder
and a decoder, endowed with non-aligned utility functions.
We characterize the encoding and decoding functions that
form an equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The
equilibrium solution is related to an auxiliary game in which
both players choose the conditional distributions in order to
maximize their expected utilities. We characterize the set of
posterior distributions that are compatible with a rate-limited
channel between the encoder and the decoder and we provide
an example of non-aligned utility functions corresponding to
parallel fading multiple access channels.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE UPPER BOUND FOR THEOREM II.8
In this section, we consider that the strategies (σ⋆, τ⋆) form
an equilibrium. Qn(u, v) denotes the empirical distribution of
the sequences (un, vn).
Φn1 (σ
⋆, τ⋆)
=
∑
un,xn,
yn,vn
Pσ⋆τ⋆(un, xn, yn, vn) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ1(ui, vi)
=
∑
un,xn,
yn,vn
Pσ⋆τ⋆(un, xn, yn, vn) ·
∑
u,v
Qn(u, v) · φ1(u, v)
=
∑
u,v
Eσ⋆,τ⋆
[
Qn(u, v)
]
· φ1(u, v) (26)
We denote by Q⋆(u, v), the expected empirical distribution
Eσ⋆,τ⋆
[
Qn(u, v)
]
= Q⋆(u, v) corresponding to the strate-
gies (σ⋆, τ⋆). The marginal distribution over U satisfies
∑
v∈V Eσ⋆,τ⋆
[
Qn(u, v)
]
= Pu(u). We denote by Qc the
complementary of the set Q. We show that the conditional
distributionQ⋆(v|u) ∈ Q should belong to the set Q of Defini-
tion II.7. Player P1 cannot choose a distribution Q(v|u) ∈ Qc
that lie outside Q, in order to maximize her long-run utility:
Φn1 (σ
⋆, τ⋆) ≤ max
Q(v|u)∈Q
E
[
Φ1(U, V )
]
. (27)
A. Information Constraint
We show that there exists an auxiliary random variable W
that satisfies the Markov chain U−
W−
V and the information
constraint maxP(x) I(X ;Y )−I(U ;W ) ≥ 0 of Definition II.5.
0 ≤ I(Xn;Y n)− I(Un;Y n) (28)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)−
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Xi)
−
n∑
i=1
H(Ui) +
n∑
i=1
H(Ui|Y n, U i−1) (29)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi)−
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Wi) (30)
≤ n ·max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )−
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Wi) (31)
= n ·
(
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− I(U ;WT , T )
)
(32)
= n ·
(
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− I(U ;W )
)
. (33)
Equation (28) comes from the Markov chain Y n−
−Xn−
−Un.
Equation (29) comes from the memoryless property of the
channel and the i.i.d. property of the source.
Equation (30) comes from the identification of the auxiliary
random variable Wi = (Y
n, U i−1) that satisfies the Markov
chain of the set Q for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
Ui −
−Wi −
− Vi. (34)
Equation (31) comes from taking the maximum over P(x).
Equation (32) comes from the introduction of the uniform ran-
dom variable T over the indices {1, . . . , n}, the independence
between T and UT , that implies I(T ;UT ) = 0 and the i.i.d.
property of the source UT = U .
Equation (33) comes from the identification of the auxiliary
random variable W = (WT , T ) = (Y
n, UT−1, T ) and the
Markov chain property:
U −
− (WT , T )−
− VT . (35)
Hence, the joint distribution Pu(u) × Q⋆(w|u) ×Q⋆(v|w)
induced by the auxiliary random variable W = (WT , T ) =
(Y n, UT−1, T ) satisfies:
1) the Markov chain condition U −
−W −
− V ,
2) the marginal condition
∑
w Pu(u)×Q⋆(w|u)×Q⋆(v|w) =
Pu(u)×Q⋆(v|u) given by equation (26),
3) the positive information constraint (33).
In App. A-B, we prove that the distribution Pu(u)×Q⋆(w|u)×
Q⋆(v|w) belongs to the set Q2, i.e. it satisfies the best-reply
condition for P2.
7B. Profitable Deviation of the Second Player
In this section, we consider a target distribution Pu(u) ×
Q(w|u) × Q(v|w) ∈ Q0 ∩ Qc2, that lies outside Q2 and that
is achievable, i.e. maxP(x) I(X ;Y ) − I(W ;U) ≥ 0. Hence,
there exists a distribution Q˜(v|w) 6= Q(v|w) that increases the
utility of player P2:
EQ˜
[
φ2(U, V )
]
> EQ
[
φ2(U, V )
]
,
⇐⇒
∑
u,w,v
Pu(u)×Q(w|u)× Q˜(v|w) × φ2(u, v)
>
∑
u,w,v
Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) × φ2(u, v).(36)
Since the target distribution Pu(u) × Q(w|u) × Q(v|w) ∈
Q0 is achievable, the second player P2 correctly decodes the
sequence Wn, with high probability. There exists a deviating
strategy τ 6= τ⋆ based on the i.i.d. distribution Q˜(v|w) that
is profitable for P2. Hence there is a δ > 0 such that the
equilibrium condition is not satisfied:
Φn2 (σ
⋆, τ) > Φ⋆2 + δ. (37)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE LOWER BOUND FOR THEOREM II.8
In this section, we provide a coding scheme (σ⋆, τ⋆) that
satisfies both equilibrium conditions of Definition II.3:
Φn2
(
σ⋆, τ⋆(σ⋆)
) ≥ max
τ˜
Φn2
(
σ⋆, τ˜
)− ε, (38)
Φn1
(
σ⋆, τ⋆(σ⋆)
) ≥ max
σ˜
Φn1
(
σ˜, τ⋆(σ˜)
)− ε. (39)
A. Separated Source-Channel Coding
We consider the target joint probability distribution
Q(u,w, v) = Pu(u) × Q(w|u) × Q(v|w) ∈ Q0 ∩ Q2 that
corresponds to the optimal utility Φ⋆1 of equation (13). By
definition of Q0, the target distribution Q(u,w, v) satisfies the
information constraint:
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− I(W ;U) ≥ 0. (40)
In this section, we assume that equation (40) is satisfied with
strict inequality (41). The case of equality in the information
constraint will be treated in App. B-B.
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− I(W ;U) > 0. (41)
Inequality (41) implies that there exists a small parameter δ >
0 and a rate R ≥ 0, such that:
R ≥ I(W ;U) + δ, (42)
R = max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− δ. (43)
We define a code c = (f, g) ∈ C(n) using the following
encoding and decoding functions, that involve sequence Wn:
f : Un −→ Xn ×Wn, (44)
g : Yn −→Wn × Vn. (45)
We show the existence of an optimal code c⋆ ∈ C(n)
such that the empirical distribution Qn(u,w, v) of symbols
(Un,Wn, V n), is close to the target distribution Q(u,w, v) =
Pu(u) × Q(w|u) × Q(v|w), with large probability. More
precisely, we prove that for all ε > 0, there exists an n¯ ∈ N,
such that for all n ≥ n¯, there exists a code c⋆ ∈ C(n) that
satisfies:
Pc⋆
(∣∣∣∣∣∣Qn(u,w, v) −Q(u,w, v)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≥ ε
)
≤ ε. (46)
The parameter ε > 0 is involved in both the definition of the
typical sequences and the upper bound of the error probability.
• Random codebook. We generate |M| = 2nR sequences
Wn(m) andXn(m), drawn from the marginal i.i.d. prob-
ability distributions Q×nw and P×nx with index m ∈M.
• Encoding function. The encoder observes the sequence of
symbols of source Un ∈ Un. It finds an index m ∈ M
such that the sequences
(
Un,Wn(m)
) ∈ A⋆nε (Q) are
jointly typical. The encoder sends the sequence Xn(m)
corresponding to the index m ∈M.
• Decoding function. The decoder observes the sequence
of channel output Y n ∈ Yn. It returns an index mˆ ∈M
such that the sequences
(
Y n, Xn(mˆ)
) ∈ A⋆nε (Q) are
jointly typical. It deduces the sequence Wn(mˆ) and
returns V n, drawn from the conditional probability dis-
tribution Q×n
v|w depending on W
n(mˆ).
• Error Event. An error occurs in the coding process if:
1) the indexes m ∈ M and mˆ ∈ M are not equal, not
unique or does not exists, 2) the sequences of symbols(
Un,Wn, V n
)
/∈ A⋆nε (Q) are not jointly typical.
Expected error probability. We introduce the parameter
ε1 > 0, in order to provide an upper bound on the expected
error probability. For all ε1 > 0 there exists an n¯ ∈ N such
that for all n ≥ n¯, the expected probability of the following
error events are bounded by ε1:
Ec
[
P
(
∀m ∈M, (Un,Wn(m)) /∈ A⋆nε (Q))] ≤ ε1,
(47)
Ec
[
P
(
∃m′ 6= m, (Y n, Xn(m′)) ∈ A⋆nε (Q))] ≤ ε1,
(48)
Ec
[
P
((
Un,Wn(m), V n
)
/∈ A⋆nε (Q)
)]
≤ ε1. (49)
(47) comes from (42) and [39, pp. 208, Covering Lemma].
(48) comes from (43) and [39, pp. 46, Packing Lemma].
(49) comes from the properties of typical sequences, stated
in [39, pp. 27], and from (47) and (48).
This proves that for all ε1 > 0, there exists a n¯ ∈ N such
that for all n ≥ n¯, there exists a code c⋆ = (f⋆, g⋆) ∈ C(n)
such that:
Pc⋆
(∣∣∣∣∣∣Qn(u,w, v)−Q(u,w, v)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≥ ε
)
= Pc⋆
((
Un,Wn(m), V n
)
/∈ A⋆nε (Q)
)
≤ ε1. (50)
8We denote by (σ⋆, τ⋆), the strategies of P1 and P2 correspond-
ing to the coding scheme c⋆ = (f⋆, g⋆) ∈ C(n) and we denote
by φ¯1 = maxu,v
∣∣∣φ1(u, v)∣∣∣, the maximal utility of P1.∣∣∣∣Φn1 (σ⋆, τ⋆)− Φ⋆1∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
u,v
φ1(u, v)×
(
E
[
Qn(u, v)
]
−Q(u, v)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ φ¯1 ·
∑
u,v
∣∣∣∣E[Qn(u, v)]−Q(u, v)∣∣∣∣ ≤ φ¯1 · ε.
Hence the pair of utilities
(
Φn1 (σ
⋆, τ⋆),Φn2 (σ
⋆, τ⋆)
)
converges
to the utilities
(
Φ⋆1,Φ
⋆
2
)
, as n −→ +∞.
B. Equality in the Information Constraint
We consider a target distribution Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w)
with equality in the information constraint:
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− I(W ;U) = 0. (51)
First case: the channel capacity is strictly positive.
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y ) > 0. (52)
We consider an auxiliary distribution Q˜(w|u) = Q˜(w) such
thatW is independent of U and we denote by IQ˜(W ;U) = 0,
the corresponding mutual information. The information con-
straint for Pu(u)× Q˜(w|u) is strictly positive:
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− IQ˜(W ;U) = maxP(x) I(X ;Y ) > 0. (53)
We construct a sequence
{Qk(u,w, v)}
k∈N∗
of convex com-
bination between Q(u,w, v) and Pu(u)× Q˜(w|u)×Q(v|w):
Qk(u,w, v) = 1
k
(
(k − 1) · Q(u,w, v)
+ Pu(u)× Q˜(w)×Q(v|w)
)
. (54)
The information constraint corresponding to Qk(u,w, v) is
strictly positive, for all k ∈ N∗:
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− IQk (W ;U)
≥ 1
n
·
(
(n− 1) · (max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− IQ(W ;U)
)
+
(
max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− IQ˜(W ;U)
))
(55)
≥ 1
n
· (max
P(x)
I(X ;Y )− IQ˜(W ;U)
)
> 0. (56)
Then, for all k ∈ N∗ the distribution Qk(u,w, v) is achievable
by using the coding scheme stated in Sec.B-A and converges
to the target distribution Q(u,w, v), as k goes to +∞. This
proves that the limit distribution Q(u,w, v) is achievable.
Second case: the channel capacity is equal to zero. This
implies that the random variables U and W of the target
distribution Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) are independent, hence
the target distribution Q(u,w, v) decomposes like:
Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×Q(v|w) = Pu(u)×Q(w)×Q(v|w). (57)
This target distribution (57) is achievable by the decoder gen-
erating (Wn, V n) with the i.i.d. distribution Q(w)×Q(v|w).
C. Unilateral Deviation of the Second Player
The target joint distributionQ(u,w, v) = Pu(u)×Q(w|u)×
Q(v|w) of Definition II.7, satisfies the information constraint
of Q0 and the strategic compatibility condition of Q2. We
consider the coding and decoding functions c⋆ = (f⋆, g⋆)
presented in App. B-A, for distribution Q(u,w, v). In this
section, we prove that the decoding function g⋆ combined
with a symbol-best-reply Q(v|w) is ε−optimal for P2. We
introduce the random event of error E ∈ {0, 1} defined by:
E =
{
0 if (Un,Wn, V n) ∈ A⋆nε (Q) and Mˆ = M,
1 if (Un,Wn, V n) /∈ A⋆nε (Q) or Mˆ 6= M.
The pair of strategies c⋆ = (f⋆, g⋆) ∈ C(n), stated in App.
B-A, induces a small error probability P(E = 1|c⋆) ≤ ε. The
expected utility of P2 is upper bounded by:∑
un,xn,yn,vn
wn,E
P(un, xn, yn, wn, vn, E|c⋆) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
= P(E = 0|c⋆)
∑
un,xn,yn,
vn,wn
P(un, xn, yn, wn, vn|c⋆, E = 0)
× 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
+ P(E = 1|c⋆)
∑
un,xn,yn,
vn,wn
P(un, xn, yn, wn, vn|c⋆, E = 1)
× 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi) (65)
≤
∑
un,xn,yn,
vn,wn
P(un, xn, yn, wn, vn|c⋆, E = 0)
× 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi) + P(E = 1|c⋆)× φ¯2. (66)
We denote by φ¯2 = maxu,v
∣∣∣φ2(u, v)∣∣∣, the maximal utility of
P2. In the following, we assume that P2 chooses the optimal
sequence V n based on her observation Y n, on the knowledge
of the code c⋆, on the hypothesis that there is no errors E = 0
and on the decoded sequenceWn. We prove that the decoding
function g⋆ presented in App. B-A, is an ε−best-reply for P2.
Equation (58) comes from the hypothesis E = 0 of correct
decoding of the sequence Wn. The decoder maximizes over
P(vn|wn, yn, c⋆, E = 0) instead of P(vn|yn, c⋆, E = 0).
Equation (59) comes from the Markov chain Un −
−Wn −

−Xn −
− Y n of the coding process c⋆ stated in App. B-A,
that induces the following equality P(un|wn, xn, yn, c⋆, E =
0) = P(un|wn, c⋆, E = 0).
Equation (60) comes from taking the sum over (xn, yn) and
9max
P(vn|yn,c⋆,E=0)
∑
un,xn,yn,
vn,wn
P(un, xn, yn, wn|c⋆, E = 0) ×P(vn|yn, c⋆, E = 0) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
≤ max
P(vn|wn,yn,c⋆,E=0)
∑
un,xn,yn,
vn,wn
P(un, xn, yn, wn|c⋆, E = 0)× P(vn|wn, yn, c⋆, E = 0) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi) (58)
= max
P(vn|wn,yn,c⋆,E=0)
∑
un,xn,yn,
vn,wn
P(xn, yn, wn|c⋆, E = 0)× P(un|wn, c⋆, E = 0)× P(vn|wn, yn, c⋆, E = 0) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
(59)
=
∑
wn
P(wn|c⋆, E = 0)× max
P(vn|wn,c⋆,E=0)
∑
vn
P(vn|wn, c⋆, E = 0)×
∑
un
P(un|wn, c⋆, E = 0) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi) (60)
≤
∑
wn
P(wn|c⋆, E = 0)× max
P(vn|wn,c⋆,E=0)
∑
vn
P(vn|wn, c⋆, E = 0)×
∑
un
( n∏
i=1
Q(ui|wi)
)
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi) + 2
√
ln 2ε · φ¯2(61)
=
∑
wn
P(wn|c⋆, E = 0)
∑
w
Q
n(w) max
P(v|w)
∑
v
P(v|w)
∑
u∈U
Q(u|w) · φ2(u, v) + 2
√
ln 2ε · φ¯2 (62)
≤
∑
w
Q(w) max
P(v|w)
∑
v
P(v|w)
∑
u∈U
Q(u|w) · φ2(u, v) + (2
√
ln 2ε + ε) · φ¯2 (63)
=
∑
u,w,v
Q(u,w) · Q(v|w) · φ2(u, v) + (2
√
ln 2ε+ ε) · φ¯2. (64)
removing the sequence yn from P(vn|wn, c⋆, E = 0), since
yn is not involved in the criteria
∑n
i=1 φ2(ui, vi).
Equation (61) is due to Lemmas 2 and 4, stated in App. B-D.
Equation (62) comes from Lemma 3, stated in App. B-D.
Equation (63) comes from the hypothesis E = 0 that implies
the empirical distribution Qn(w) of sequences wn is close to
the target Q(w).
Equation (64) comes from the definition of the set
Q2 that requires the distribution Q(v|w) maximizes
maxP(v|w)
∑
v P(v|w)
∑
u∈U Q(u|w) · φ2(u, v).
We proved that the equilibrium condition is satisfied:
Φn2
(
σ⋆, τ⋆(σ⋆)
) ≥ max
τ˜
Φn2
(
σ⋆, τ˜
)− ε. (67)
D. Lemmas
To simplify the notations of Lemma 2 and 3, we remove
the conditioning over the code c⋆ and the event E = 0 in the
probabilities.
Lemma 2 The following expression satisfies:∣∣∣∣∣
∑
wn,vn
P(wn, vn)
∑
un
P(un|wn) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
−
∑
wn,vn
P(wn, vn)
∑
un
( n∏
i=1
Q(ui|wi)
)
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ φ¯2 · 2
√
ln 2ε. (68)
Lemma 3 For all sequence wn ∈ Wn, we have this equality:
max
P(vn|wn)
∑
vn
P(vn|wn)
∑
un
( n∏
i=1
Q(ui|wi)
)
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ2(ui, vi)
=
∑
w
Q
n(w) max
P(v|w)
∑
v
P(v|w)
∑
u∈U
Q(u|w) · φ2(u, v).
The proof of Lemma 2 is based on Lemma 4 and the proof of
Lemma 3 comes from the hypothesis E = 0, of jointly typical
sequences (un, wn, vn) ∈ A⋆nε (Q).
Lemma 4 (Posteriors beliefs) The coding scheme c⋆ =
(f⋆, g⋆) ∈ C(n) described in App. B-A satisfies:
EWn
[
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣P(Ui|Wn, c⋆, E = 0)−Q(Ui|Wi)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
]
≤ 2
√
ln 2ε. (69)
Lemma 4 corresponds to the notion of “Strategic Distance”
introduced in [5] and in the proof of [3, Lemma 36] that
implies the main result of [2] and [4].
Proof. [Lemma 4] We consider the code c⋆ = (f⋆, g⋆) ∈
C(n), stated in App. B-A and we assume that the sequences
(Un,Wn, V n) ∈ A⋆nε (Q) are jointly typical, i.e. the error
event is E = 0. We provide an upper bound on the L1 distance
based on Pinsker’s and Jensen’s inequalities. We denote by
10
D(P||Q) the K-L divergence between distributions P and Q.
EWn
[
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣P(Ui|Wn, c⋆, E = 0)−Q(Ui|Wi)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
]
=
∑
wn
P(wn|c⋆, E = 0)
×
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣P(Ui|wn, c⋆, E = 0)−Q(Ui|wi)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
(70)
≤
∑
wn
P(wn|c⋆, E = 0)
×
1
n
n∑
i=1
√
2 ln 2 ·D
(
P(Ui|wn, c⋆, E = 0)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Q(Ui|wi)
)
(71)
≤
√
2 ln 2
∑
wn
P(wn|c⋆, E = 0)
×
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
D
(
P(Ui|wn, c⋆, E = 0)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Q(Ui|wi)
)
(72)
≤
√√√√2 ln 2 · 1
n
n∑
i=1
EWn
[
D
(
P(Ui|Wn, c⋆, E = 0)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Q(Ui|Wi)
)]
.
(73)
In equation (70), the L1 distance regards Ui.
Equation (71) comes from Pinsker’s inequality, [40, pp. 370].
Equation (72) comes from Jensen’s inequality for x 7→ √x.
1
n
n∑
i=1
EWn
[
D
(
P(Ui|Wn, c⋆, E = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Q(Ui|Wi))
]
=
1
n
∑
(un,wn)∈A⋆nε (Q)
P(un, wn|c⋆, E = 0)
× log2
1∏n
i=1Q(ui|wi)
− 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Ui|Wn, c⋆, E = 0)
(74)
≤ 1
n
∑
(un,wn)∈A⋆nε (Q)
P(un, wn|c⋆, E = 0)
× n ·
(
H(U |W ) + ε
)
− 1
n
H(Un|Wn, c⋆, E = 0) (75)
=
1
n
I(Un;Wn|c⋆, E = 0)− I(U ;W ) + ε (76)
≤ log |M| − I(U ;W ) + ε (77)
≤ I(U ;W ) + ε− I(U ;W ) + ε (78)
≤ 2ε. (79)
Equation (74) is the definition of the K-L divergence.
Equation (75) comes from the property of typical sequences
(Un,Wn) ∈ A⋆nε (Q) in [39, pp. 26] and of the entropy.
Equation (76) comes from the i.i.d. property of the source U .
Equations (77) and (78) come from the cardinality of the
codebook |M|, introduced in App. B-A.
Equation (76) involves the information leakage
1
n
I(Un;Wn|c⋆, E = 0) corresponding to the amount of
information received by P2, regarding the source U
n. The
information leakage induced by the coding scheme for
empirical coordination, is investigated in [22].
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